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Predicting the Future of the FTAA
PatrickJames*
Michael Lusztig**
Among the components of U.S. foreign policy in recent years, trade is probably the
least coherent. The logic of trade policy could even be described as byzantine. While trade
in industrial goods is fairly free, the United States has only recently, and reluctantly, begun
the arduous process of liberalization in the agricultural sector. While long satisfied with
playing the leading role in the world trading system, the past fifteen years have seen the
United States become increasingly interested in sub-systemic trade deals in the Americas
and the Pacific Rim that ultimately may undermine the overall effectiveness of the World
Trade Organization (WTO). While the Republican Party has taken the lead in the liberalization of trade for much of the post-war era, the Clinton presidency has been characterized by Democratic leadership, and Republican intransigence, in the extension of free
trade. Finally, while expansion of markets is the putative objective of trade liberalization,
issues such as the environment, labor standards, education, and narcotics all have been
linked to recent free trade initiatives.
This lack of coherence is underscored by the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
(FTAA) initiative, announced at the December 1994 Miami Summit of the (non-Cuban)
hemispheric countries. Despite the fact that the United States had an unprecedented
opportunity to institutionalize a long-standing foreign policy objective ensuring commitment to liberal democracy and free market economics in Latin America, it has declined to
act upon it. Still reeling from the effects of the November midterm elections, the Clinton
administration failed to articulate a coherent set of objectives for the Miami summit. 1
Instead, focusing on issues that were less politically divisive than trade (most notably narcotics, the environment, and the role of women in development), the Administration
abdicated its leadership role with respect to foreign economic policy and hemispheric
trade liberalization to smaller countries, such as Canada, Chile, and Mexico. These countries, not the United States, served as the driving force behind the unanimous agreement
to construct a hemispheric free trade zone by 2005.2

**

1.

2.

Patrick James, Department of Political Science, Iowa State University, Ames, IA.
Michael Lusztig, Department of Political Science, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX.
The original plan was to incorporate the Summit into the Administration's long-term foreign economic policy agenda, which included securing fast-track authority to extend the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and amend the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) in order to
ensure that small Caribbean countries not suffer from trade diversion in the wake of NAFTA. With
the Republicans gaining control of Congress, these objectives seemed to move at least temporarily
out of reach. Robert Pastor, The ClintonAdministration and the Americas: The PostwarRhythm and
Blues, 38 JOURNAl: OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS 99-129 (1996).
Howard J. Wiarda, After Miami: The Summit, the Peso Crisis, and the Future of US-Latin
American Relations, 37 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS 43-68 (1995).
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It was not until the autumn of 1997 that the Clinton administration undertook to
secure "fast-track" authority to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with other countries in the hemisphere. 3 However, for only the second time since a like procedure was
introduced in 1934, a U.S. president failed to receive authority to negotiate reciprocal
trade agreements free from congressional oversight. 4 Shortly thereafter, the "Lewinsky
Affair" broke and the Administration found itself once again without sufficient political
capital to invest in hemispheric trade.
Meanwhile, it is perhaps not too trite to emphasize that the other major economies in
the hemisphere have not sat patiently on the sidelines waiting for the United States to
adopt a leadership role. Instead, many, especially Brazil, have sought to guide the process
in a way most favorable to their own foreign policy objectives. Increasingly, the perspective from South America is that the FTAA can be used as a counterweight against U.S.
economic dominance. Put differently, it is becoming clear that there are competing
visions of the optimal structure for the proposed FTAA. What are these? Which is likely to
prevail? How much influence is the United States likely to have on the final outcome
given its demonstrated ambivalence to date? These issues are fundamental to our understanding of the future of foreign economic policy in the Western Hemisphere.
Given the complexity of the issues involved, the extant literature on the FTAA is dedicated to explanation of events of the past five years. This paper seeks to expand the literature
by attempting to predict the outcome of bargaining over key domestic and foreign policy
issues that, in turn, will inform our understanding of the future of hemispheric free trade.
To undertake this task, we employ a relatively new methodology, expected utility forecasting, which has enjoyed growing acceptance in the social sciences in recent years.
This paper unfolds in four sections. First, we provide context through an examination
of some of the key issues to be negotiated, both domestically and internationally, in the
coming years. Second, we provide an exposition of expected utility forecasting. The third
section provides predictions and implications stemming from them. Finally, the fourth
section summarizes the results of the study.

I. Issues to be Negotiated.
Two key issues can be identified as the most salient for our understanding of the future
of the FTAA and the role of the United States. Collectively, these issues conform to the
two-level game-negotiating framework articulated by Robert Putnam. 5 The first, which
determines the size of the domestic win-set (or the range of international agreements that
could survive domestic ratification), concerns whether or not President Clinton's succes-

3.

4.

A product of the 1974 Trade Act, the fast-track mechanism allows the executive branch to enter
into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that are not subject to amendment at the ratification stage. Congressional oversight is limited to acceptance or rejection of the agreement as
negotiated.
Technically, Congress did not refuse the president's request for fast-track authority. The

5.

Administration withdrew the request when it became clear that there would be insufficient
support in Congress.
Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 427-460 (1988).
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sor will secure fast-track authorization, and what conditions Congress attaches to fasttrack authority. The second concerns the terms of the international agreement reached. In
other words, it recognizes that while an agreement-in-principle exists to create a FTAA,
there are divergent views on the optimal format of the new regime. We consider these
issues in turn.
A.

FAST-TRACK AUTHORITY.

Under the terms of the Constitution, Congress has the authority to set tariffs and other
forms of import protection. While putatively an instrument of economic management,
the tariff has long had distinctly political origins and effects in the United States. In the
nineteenth century, the politics of the tariff were largely regional, with Southern farmers
6
and Northern industrialists pitted against one another in a congressional tug-of-war.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the battle over the tariff shifted. At issue now was the
role of protectionist "rent-seekers" and their allies in the Republican Party.7 In fact, the
last quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed an all but uninterrupted series of tariff
increases that served to privilege rent-seeking interests. 8 The early twentieth century ushered in the era of the so-called "scientific" tariff-an attempt to level the playing field, in
terms of cost of production, between domestic and foreign producers. The scientific tariff, although an obviation of the logic of comparative advantage, constituted implicit
recognition of the need to limit the influence of rent-seeking within Congress.
The scientific tariff failed in this regard. As is well documented in the literature on
public choice, protectionist rent-seekers are privileged by congressional tariff-making.
Rent-seekers are expected to outperform advocates of free market economics for two reasons. First, free trade constitutes an "asymmetric" public good. The benefits of protection
are more concentrated than the benefits of free trade. As a result, rent-seekers are more
motivated, and hence better able, to overcome collective action problems than are free
traders. 9 Second, the costs of free trade are more manifest than the benefits. This translates into a public (and hence congressional) interest in protectionism. As Gordon
Tullock notes, "The arguments for a protective tariff are simple and superficially obvious,

6.

The most obvious manifestation was the 1828 Tariff of Abominations. However, the variable
tariff between 1828 and the 1861 Morrill Tariff tended to reflect the makeup of congressional
coalitions, as well as prevailing economic conditions. See, e.g., JONATHAN J. PINCUS, PRESSURE
GROUPS AND POLITICS IN ANTEBELLUM TARIFFS (1977); EDWARD STANWOOD, AMERICAN TARIFF
CONTROVERSIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1903); F.W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE

7.

UNITED STATES (7th ed. 1923).
Rent-seeking is the attempt to use the power of the state to transfer, rather than create, wealth.

John A.C. Conybeare, Tariff Protection in Developed and Developing Countries:A Case Sectoral
and Longitudinal Analysis, 37 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 441-467 (1983). The tariff is an
excellent example that serves to provide monopoly, or oligopoly, "rents" by restricting competition in critical sectors of the economy.
8.

See C.A. STERN, PROTECTIONIST REPUBLICANISM: REPUBLICAN TARIFF POLICY IN THE MCKINLEY

PERIOD (1971); Max Gideonse, Foreign Trade and Commercial Policy Since 1860, in THE
GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (Harold F. Williamson ed., 1944).

9.

See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTION ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965); REAL LAVERGNE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. TARIFFS: AN EMPIRICAL

ANALYSIS (1983).
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while the arguments against it are unfortunately complicated and indirect. Granted that
the voter has no motive for becoming well informed, he or she will buy the simpler of the
0
two explanations."'
Congressional domination by rent-seekers reached its zenith with the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff of 1930. Described by Secretary of State Cordell Hull as "a continuous round of
political and legislative debauches with graft aforethought,"' an unholy alliance of rentseekers and their representatives in Congress contrived to raise the average dutiable tariff
from 38.2 percent to 55.3 percent. 12 The result was rapid deterioration of world trade, as
America's trading partners retaliated with import barriers of their own. Although partly a
function of the Great Depression (which Smoot-Hawley exacerbated), U.S. exports in
1933 were only one-half of their 1929 levels; in turn, this contributed to a rise in unemployment from roughly 400,000 in 1929, to a staggering 12 million by 1932.13
Recognizing Congress's vulnerability to rent-seeking special interests, the
Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to shift tariff-making authority out of the
hands of Congress and into the executive branch. Under the auspices of the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act (RTAA, 1934), Congress allowed the president to enter into bilateral trade treaties independent of congressional oversight or ratification. Although the
transfer of authority was not permanent (the act had to be renewed roughly every three
years) it did offer the president a great deal of flexibility. The only major stipulation was
the president was not allowed to lower tariffs on any given commodity by more than fifty
percent of their baseline (Smoot-Hawley) levels.14
Among the many changes engendered by the post-war trading world was countries'
increasing shift from tariffs to non-tariff barriers (NTB). So prevalent had the use of
NTBs become, in fact, that the Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) was launched as a means of restricting the use of NTBs. The problem for
the Nixon administration, however, was that the RTAA allowed for executive independence only with respect to negotiated tariff reductions.
As a consequence, the Trade Act (1974) and Trade Agreements Act (1979) collectively
introduced and institutionalized a new procedure that allowed the executive branch to
negotiate reductions in tariffs and NTBs with limited congressional oversight. Known as
fast-track authority, the new procedure differs from the RTAA mechanism in more than
just substantive breadth. First, fast-track authority is more limited. Like the RTAA, it is
granted for discreet periods only; unlike the RTAA, however, it is also tied to specific
negotiations, and Congress (more precisely the Senate Finance and House Ways and

10. Gordon Tullock, Future Directionsfor Rent-Seeking Research, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
RENT-SEEKING (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988).
11. William R. Allen, The International Trade Philosophy of Cordell Hull, 1907-1933, 43 AMERICAN
ECONOMIC REVIEW 115 (1953).
12.

DAVID A. LAKE, POWER, PROTECTION AND FREE TRADE: INTERNATIONAL SOURCES OF U.S.
COMMERCIAL STRATEGY, 1887-1939 (1988). For more on the impact of rent-seekers on the

Smoot-Hawley Tariff, see E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF: A STUDY

OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN PRESSURE POLITICS, AS SHOWN IN THE 1929-1930 REVISION OF THE

TARIFF (1935).
13.

DAVID W. BRADY, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY MAKING (1988).

14. After 1945, the president was allowed to lower tariffs by up to fifty percent from their January
1, 1945 levels.
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Means Committees) is to be consulted regularly with respect to the negotiations. Second,
there is also a back-end check to executive authority. Whereas the RTAA did not provide
for any congressional oversight of negotiated tariff reductions, fast track requires implementing legislation (as opposed to treaty ratification) that is drafted by the president and
must be considered within
must pass both houses of Congress. Implementing legislation
15
ninety (legislative) days and is immune from amendment.
Together, the RTAA and fast-track procedures allowed for unprecedented reductions in
U.S. import barriers. It is also noteworthy that until 1997, only one president had ever
been denied either RTAA or fast-track negotiating authority. 16
The politicization of fast-track authority began with the ratification of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although initiated and negotiated during the
Bush administration, the treaty had not received Congressional approval by the time of the
1992 elections. Under strong pressure to scupper NAFTA from core constituencies of the
Democratic Party, including trade unions and environmentalists, Candidate Bill Clinton
was loath to commit to rubber-stamping an initiative that was closely associated with his
soon-to-be predecessors, George Bush and Ronald Reagan. As such, he insisted that parallel
agreements, dedicated to the protection of labor and environmental standards respectively,
be appended to the original trilateral accord. Despite grumbling on the part of
Congressional Republicans, and over the opposition of many Congressional Democrats,
NAFTA received congressional approval and was signed into law in December 1993.17
In August 1997, the politics of international trade negotiations were revisited when
President Clinton announced that he would request fast-track authority to negotiate freer
trade with particular emphasis on Asia and Latin America. 1 8 The president soon faced,
however, two pockets of congressional opposition. Almost immediately, House
Republicans began to insist on the unprecedented provision that negotiators be bound to
parameters outlined in legislation authorizing fast-track authority. The intention was to
ensure that the Administration not have a free hand in linking trade liberalization to
other issues, such as labor and environmental standards. Meanwhile, protectionist
Democrats, led by Rep. Richard Gephardt of Missouri, aligned themselves with organized
labor in opposition to granting fast-track authority.
The president's half-hearted commitment to trade liberalization in the post-NAFTA era
cost him the initiative on trade liberalization. Although NAFTA was an early foreign policy
victory for Clinton, it alienated many within his own party. Thus, rather than follow up
enthusiastically by seeking a leadership role in negotiating the proposed FTAA, Clinton concentrated on rebuilding support within the Democratic Party. Indeed, he rebuffed overtures
from GOP congressional leaders, who offered quick passage of a fast-track bill, to seek

15.

See I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS (2nd ed. 1992); FREDERICK W. MAYER, INTERPRETING
NAFTA: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1998).

16. In 1947, congressional intransigence forced President Truman to abandon plans to negotiate
an International Trade Organization. Eventually, of course, Truman was successful in securing
the authority to negotiate a component of the ITO that came to be known as the GATT.
17. The best overview of the politics of NAFTA is MAYER, INTERPRETING NAFTA (1998).
18. Audio Recording: Radio Address of the Presidentto the Nation, Martha's Vineyard, MA, August
23, 1997, available at www.whitehouse.gov/WH/html/1997-08-23.html.
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negotiating authority in the spring of 1997.19 By the time the request did come to Congress,
congressional Republicans, sensing desperation on the part of the president, began to insist
upon limiting the maneuverability of the Administration's negotiators.20
Meanwhile, organized labor weighed into the debate. The AFL-CIO began a television
advertising campaign that denounced further opening of markets, and threatened to help
defeat any member of Congress who supported such an initiative. 21 Similarly, environmental groups, pointing to the negative impact of NAFTA, insisted that any future negotiations include provisions for effective environmental protection.
By early mid-November it was clear that proposed fast-track legislation would not pass
the House. With only minimal support from House Democrats (an estimated forty-two
votes out of 205) and lukewarm Republican support (GOP leaders counted on between
160 and 170 votes out of 228), the Administration pulled the fast-track bill rather than
suffer certain congressional defeat. 22 The Administration has not sought fast-track
authority since, and it seems clear that no attempt will be made in the presidential election year of 2000. This leaves the prospects for the third Summit of the Americas, scheduled for Quebec City in 2001, very unclear.
B.

FORMAT OF THE FTAA.

The FTAA appears to represent the culmination of a sea-change in Latin American
countries' philosophies towards free enterprise, free markets, and economic integration
with the industrialized economies to the North. Indeed, there has long existed a tension
in Latin America between the development of market and the protection of state. In the
case of the latter, protection largely took the form of resistance to U.S. domination.
Policy outcomes are often determined by fate. Since they received their independence
from the Iberian colonial powers in the early nineteenth century, most Latin American
countries have been plagued by regular economic crises, which have been accompanied
by fundamental shifts in the prevailing economic regime.
Thus, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, most Latin American countries
integrated into the world economy through the strategy of export-led development,
which entailed the provision of raw materials to the industrializing powers of Europe and
the United States. The recession of the 1870s paved the way for a wave of nascent industrialization. However, political instability and-partially as a result-a dearth of investment capital undermined economic development. As a result, Latin America's role in the
global economic division of labor remained rooted in the primary sector, with most
economies reliant on a few cash crops or commodities.

19. Art Pine, Clinton, GOP Miscues Seen as Key to Fast-TrackHalt,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1997.
20. It is also clear that GOP leaders subordinated their foreign policy objectives to political ones.
In early October, for example, with fast-track legislation in obvious peril, House Speaker Newt
Gingrich implied that Republicans were loath to assist the president on a measure that was
opposed by so many within the Democratic Party. Neil A. Lewis, Senate Panel Lets Trade Bill
Easily Clear the FirstHurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1997.
21. Art Pine & Janet Hook, Clinton Pulls Trade Bill Rather than Risk Defeat, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 10,
1997.
22. Pine, Clinton. Id.
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The failure of the industrialization initiative told most strongly during the world economic crisis of the 1930s. While the impact was felt throughout the world, the vulnerable,
undiversified economies of Latin America were devastated. The dislocation of the period
created grave social instability. It also provided the means for populist strongmen, or
caudillos, to assume virtually dictatorial powers. In many cases-Mexico is an excellent
example-populism was reinforced by nationalism, which in turn was directed outwards
towards countries portrayed as economic oppressors.
In academic circles, this sentiment found voice in what became known as dependencia,
or dependency theory.23 More pertinently, economic nationalism manifested itself in a
development strategy known as import-substituting industrialization (ISI), which
became the organizing principle of the major Latin American economies from the 1940s
until the 1980s.
ISI is a development strategy that entails the construction of formidable import barriers, allowing domestic producers of durable consumer goods to prosper. It is a defensive
plan (unlike the more traditional infant industry strategy) that forsakes the long-term
objective of global industrial competitiveness in favor of the construction of a diversified
(albeit inefficient) economy. As a result, most producers, uncompetitive in export markets, are content to produce solely for domestic consumption. Ultimately, of course,
domestic growth potential is exhausted. Profits slow, which in turn depresses investment.
Production facilities become increasingly outdated, growth rates decline, unemployment
24
rises and deep recessions ensue.
This final, or exhaustion, phase of ISI struck most Latin American economies in the
1960s and early 1970s. The effects were most severe in Chile, which featured a coup d'etat
and subsequent forced conversion to free market economics under General Augusto
Pinochet. Most of the other major Latin American economies, however, were able to cling
to inefficient economic practices through the fortuity of circumstance, specifically, the
availability of loans from (largely) U.S. banks that precluded the imperative for fundamental economic reform in the face of ISI exhaustion. Borrowing was facilitated by the
glut of deposits, known as petro-dollars, in U.S. banks from newly oil-rich countries in
the wake of the 1970s energy crises. However, with the decline of oil prices in the early
1980s, petro-dollars dried up, and the larger Latin American economies, most prominently Mexico, found themselves in untenable economic straits. Deeply indebted, saddled with

23. Dependency theory assumes a global division of labor in which the industrial powers of the
north conspire to keep the Latin American economies in a position of economic dependence.
Colonialism was the earliest manifestation; penetration of multinational corporations characterized the process in the twentieth century. In either case, surplus value from resource extraction was patriated to the dominant economies of the developed world, leaving Latin America
perpetually underdeveloped. See J.Samuel Valenzuela &Arturo Valenzuela, Modernizationand
Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment, 10
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 535-57 (1978).

24.

For more on ISI, see Albert 0. Hirschman, The Political Economy of Import-Substituting
Industrializationin Latin America, 82 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECoNoMICs 2-32 (1968); Joseph L.
Love, Raul Prebisch and the Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange, 15 LATIN AMERICAN
RESEARCH REVIEW 45-72 (1980).
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inefficient productive sectors, and facing rampant inflation and capital flight, most Latin
25
American economies suffered through a terrible depression through the 1980s.
And so this latest crisis spawned yet another shift in economic policy in Latin America.
Stimulated by any number of factors-pressure exerted by international lending agencies
such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, the economic success of Chile,
the prevailing dominance of free market economics (Reaganism and Thatcherism) over
interventionism and social democracy in the developed world-the major Latin
American economies began to embrace trade liberalization and other forms of economic
orthodoxy. Brazil and Argentina formed the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR); Mexico joined NAFTA; smaller regional trading blocs were re-invigorated in
Central America, the Caribbean, and the Andean nations; finally, bilateral and trilateral
26
accords among larger economies were concluded.
As noted in the introduction, by the time of the 1994 Miami Summit, it was the Latin
American economies that were in the unprecedented position of pressing for more liberal
trade, while the United States was more resistant. There were, however, differences in the
objectives of the major Latin American economies. Chile, for example, which had had an
earlier start in the transition to liberalism, was eager to tie its fortunes to those of the
more robust economies of NAFTA. Argentina, and especially Brazil, were more wary of
U.S. domination of the proposed trade regime, and sought to emphasize the importance
27
of MERCOSUR as a counterweight to U.S. dominance.
Indeed, four potential models present themselves as routes for the construction of the
FTAA. 28 Each would have implications for the balance of power within the hemisphere.
The route originally envisioned by the United States was the extension of NAFTA, an
idea that dates to the 1990 Enterprise for the Americas Initiative articulated by President
Bush. From this perspective, countries would commit to ensuring that their trading rules
were compliant with those of the North American Free Trade Agreement by 2005.
Because NAFTA is not a comprehensive trilateral accord, certain elements apply only
bilaterally, some comprehensive negotiations would have to take place. In the face of U.S.
intransigence, Mexico has emerged as the de facto champion of this approach. Having
signed the so-called G-3 accord with Colombia and Venezuela, Mexico also has bilateral
trade agreements in place with Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, and Bolivia.

25.

See ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE MONEY LENDERS: BANKERS AND A WORLD IN TURMOIL (1982); JACKIE
RODDICK, THE DANCE OF THE MILLIONS: LATIN AMERICA AND THE DEBT CRISIS (1988).

26. The most prominent among these were between Chile and Mexico, and among Mexico,
Colombia and Venezuela. For more on trade liberalization in the Americas in this period, see
NAFTA AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE AMERICAS (Elsie Echeverri-Carroll ed., 1995);
DUNCAN GREEN, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE RISE OF MARKET ECONOMICS IN LATIN AMERICA (1995);
INTEGRATING THE HEMISPHERE: PERSPECTIVES FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (Ana Julia

Jatar & Sidney Weintraub eds., 1997); THE AMERICAS IN TRANSITION: THE CONTOURS OF
REGIONALISM (Gordon Mace & Louis Belanger eds., 1999).
27. Pedro da Motta Veiga, Brazil's Strategy for Trade Liberalization and Economic Integrationfor the
Western Hemisphere, in INTEGRATING THE HEMISPHERE (Ana Julia Jatar & Sidney Weintraub eds.,
1997).
28. Richard L. Bernal, Regional Trade Agreements and the Establishment of a Free Trade Agreement
of the Americas, 27 LAW AND POLICY ININTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 945-62 (1996).
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The perception among some countries is that a bilateral deal with Mexico is a back-door
29
means of gaining access to the benefits of NAFTA.
A second route, preferred by Brazil, is the extension of MERCOSUR into a broader,
South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA). Under this scenario, SAFTA would be dominated by the largest economy in South America, Brazil, while U.S. dominance would be
limited largely to the NAFTA countries (and presumably Central American and
Caribbean states). Brazil and the United States, then, under this scenario, would constitute the poles in a bi-polar balance of economic power in the hemisphere. Ultimately, the
FTAA would constitute what Bernal calls bi-polar amalgamation. Obviously, a proposed
SAFTA would be far smaller and less economically powerful than NAFTA. On the other
hand, other countries in the hemisphere, tired of waiting for the United States to take a
lead, and also wary of total U.S. dominance, may well be attracted by the creation of an
economic counterweight. 30 On the other hand, the recent economic crisis in Brazil has
served to militate against that country's commitment to trade liberalization, and hence
has undercut SAFTAs momentum.
A third route, which appears to have certain logistical advantages, would be the amalgamation of the five largest existing free trade agreements in the hemisphere. The advantage here is that it would reduce the number of issues to be negotiated, without necessarily creating tension between proponents of routes one or two. There are disadvantages,
however. Incompatibility among the rules of the various trade agreements would obviate
many of the apparent logistical benefits. Indeed, the fact that some of these agreements,
such as MERCOSUR, constitute customs unions, whereas NAFTA is only a trade agreement, would be only the most significant issue.3 1 In addition, amalgamation would constitute a weak counterweight to U.S. dominance; given historical relations between the
United States and Latin America, this is also a consideration.
Fourth, and most obviously, the FTAA can be constructed de novo. Here too there are
advantages and disadvantages. The primary problem with this approach is that the logistical demands would be enormous, the clock is ticking as the deadline of 2005 looms, and
the two largest economies are distracted by domestic considerations. On the other hand,
such distractions could keep the United States and Brazil from butting heads during the
crucial stages of the negotiation process. In this sense, then, logistical considerations may
32
assume less importance.
In sum, the most likely outcome of the FTAA negotiation process hinges largely on the
first issue examined-the prospect of a U.S. president winning fast-track negotiating
authority in 2001. At this point, therefore, it is appropriate to shift the discussion to an
examination of the predictions generated by the Decisions Insights model.
29. Id.; see also Ivan Bernier & Martin Roy, NAFTA and Mercosur: Two Competing Models?, in THE
AMERICAS IN TRANSITION (Gordon Mace & Louis Belanger eds.,)
30. Bernal, Regional Trade Agreements; Bernier & Roy, NAFTA and Mercosur; Maria Regine Soares
de Lima, Brazil's Alternative Vision, in THE AMERICAS IN TRANSITION (Gordon Mace & Louis
Belanger eds.).
31. Equally problematic is the fact that MERCOSUR and NAFTA both contain numerous countryspecific exemptions. These, obviously, would be difficult to generalize.
32. For a fine overview of regional considerations in the FTAA process, see Gordon Mace & Louis
Belanger, A ProvisionalAssessment, in THE AMERICAS IN TRANSITION (Gordon Mace & Louis
Belanger eds.).
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II. Expected Utility Forecasting.
Although it has begun to move into the methodological mainstream, 33 the expected
utility forecasting model developed by Decisions Insights Inc. is an innovative research
tool. Embedded within the rational choice tradition, the model simulates bargaining,
along a particular issue dimension, of all actors relevant to a particular set of negotiations. 34 Bargaining takes place over a number of iterations until a stable equilibrium is
created-that is, a point at which no alternative proposal more closely reflects the aggregate weighted preferences of all relevant actors. In other words, the equilibrium point
minimizes the euclidean distance from the ideal points of all actors, controlling for their
bargaining power and interest in the issue at hand.
The logic of the model is akin to an iterative version of the familiar median voter

hypothesis. 35 However, whereas the median voter hypothesis suggests that a proposal in
the middle of the distribution has the greatest possibility of success, the Decisions Insight
model predicts differently because it recognizes that participants vary with respect to
intensity of preference, power, and other ways as well. The median voter hypothesis
assumes that each voter has the same incentive to vote, and that each vote is weighted
equally; the Decisions Insights model makes no such assumption. Instead, it is based on
two fundamental premises. First, actors at the bargaining table bring differential power
capabilities to bear on the negotiations; second, actors bring differential intensities of
preference to the table depending on the issue at hand. This second premise suggests that
even a strong country will have limited influence in negotiations in which it has only
passing interest, because it is predicted to bring only a fraction of its power capabilities to
bear during negotiations.
In sum and in contrast to the traditional median voter hypothesis, the algorithm within the Decisions Insights model takes three criteria--each actor's ideal position on a given
issue, its power capabilities, and the salience of that issue to the actor-into consideration
when predicting an equilibrium point for iterated negotiations. The comparative complexity of the model justifies a slightly more detailed explanation.
Like most rational choice models, the expected utility forecasting model assumes complete and transitive preference orderings on the part of all actors. It also assumes that
issues are uni-dimensional, and that actors' preferences for possible outcomes diminish
steadily with distance from their ideal outcomes. 36 To illustrate, imagine a set of actors

33. See, e.g., the special issue of InternationalInteractionsdedicated to expected utility forecasting,
vol. 23, nos. 3-4, 1997.

34. The model was developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. Space does not permit a technical
explanation of the model; for this see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, PoliticalForecasting:An
Expected Utility Model, in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DECISION MAKING: MODELS, APPLICATIONS AND
COMPARISONS (Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Frans Stokman eds., 1994).

35.

See Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (1958); ANTHONY

DOWNS,

AN

ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).

36. Complete preference orderings demand that an actor be able to compare any given alternative
to one or more others and to make a choice; transitivity mandates that if outcome A is preferred to outcome B, and outcome B to outcome C, then outcome A will be preferred to outcome C.
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bargaining over a range of issues. For each issue, imagine a universe of outcomes that can
be plotted along a continuum. Using 0 and 100 as the polar points, each outcome along
the continuum can be assigned an arbitrary number based on its location relative to the
poles. Similarly, each actor's power capabilities can be assigned a relative weighting of 0 to
100, where 0 connotes no power to affect bargaining, and 100 represents all of the coercive power, or the ability to act unilaterally. Finally, for each issue, every actor can be
assigned a salience score from 0 to 100. This score determines the relative allocation of
bargaining resources (or effort) that an actor will dedicate to any given issue.
Knowledge of ideal positions, capabilities and relative salience provides the raw material necessary for the model to generate a point prediction along the issue continuum. This
prediction is produced following an iterated series of simulated bargaining rounds that
generate an outcome with the property that no counter-proposal exists that can trump
that outcome. To visualize the process, imagine a "multipolar" tug-of-war, with each player holding an end of the rope that is arranged like one of the spokes of a wheel and this is
connected at the center. The center, or hub, would shift in accordance with differences in
strength and effort on the part of the players. Weaker players, unable to affect the outcome on their own, could be expected to align with stronger ones. Assume further that
participants eventually tire of the process, and the center (analogous to our equilibrium
outcome) settles into a final resting position.
While the outcome of the model mimics the n-player tug-of-war described above, in
terms of its operation the model is more complex. Aggregation of positions held by the
actors, and qualified by power capabilities and issue salience, focuses on dyadic relationships. 37 Put differently, the model's algorithm examines how the members of any given
pairing impact upon one another at any particular iteration. Each member of the dyad is
compared with respect to perceptions of its euclidean point on the issue continuum versus that of its dyadic partner. It is important to note that the computer-based algorithm
assesses all dyads simultaneously. For each dyad there are three possibilities:
(1) Both actors in the dyad see their relative positions as weak (i.e., that confrontation will be fruitless, and hence yield negative utility); as a result, there is a mutual
adjustment of position towards one another.
(2) One actor perceives positive utility from confrontation, and one actor perceives
negative utility. In this case the latter will adjust its position towards that of the
former.
(3) Both actors perceive positive utility from confrontation, and therefore both hold
firm.
At each iteration in the simulated negotiating process (that is, after each "round" of
bargaining), the model provides a forecast based on the aggregated position created by
simultaneous consideration of each dyadic confrontation. However, this position does
not necessarily constitute a stable equilibrium outcome. Thus, the model continues to
recalculate adjustments through further iterations until an outcome is reached that can
be considered stable-in the sense that further changes to the aggregated position
become so marginal that transaction costs effectively preclude further effort.

37. Note that where n relevant actors have been identified, there are n(n-1)/2 dyads at play. Thus,
10 actors would generate 45 dyadic relationships.
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Alternatively, if confrontation continues through innumerable iterations, the overall outcome is considered unstable. Under these conditions, no stable, negotiated outcome is
predicted to emerge from the bargaining process.
As with any computer-generated model, the predicted real-world outcome hinges on
the data supplied. In the case of the Decisions Insights model, necessary data include the
list of relevant actors, their optimal outcomes, their relative capabilities, and their relative
issue salience. How do we collect these data?
In order to ensure that our data are as accurate as possible, we rely on a decidedly standard methodology: information derived from an expert in the field. In other words, we
seek to bring to bear the same detailed knowledge and expertise as are found in traditional case-study methods, but marry this with the ability to predict policy outcomes.
The data for this study were generated in the summer of 1999 by an expert in the area
of hemispheric trade, including Latin American and U.S. trade politics. To counteract
bias, the expert was not informed about the operation of the model. Thus, it bears reiterating that, while the expert generated the raw data, the predictions have been derived
from the model. Indeed, the expert was not asked for substantive predictions, and it may
well be the case that the model produces a predicted outcome with which the expert disagrees. 38 While some are uncomfortable with scientific predictions based on input from a
single area expert, it is worth noting that the entire qualitative school is based on precisely
this methodology. In this respect, at least, the model's operation should be considered
fairly mainstream.

38.

Considerations related to the reliability of data might argue in favor of the use of more than
one area expert. However, repeated applications have shown that accuracy of point predictions
is not improved through the use of a greater number of area experts. Two reasons can be
offered in defense of the current approach. First, expert-generated data tend to be very highly
correlated, even controlling for differences in ideology. Second, given the nature of the model's
calculations, coding discrepancies generally have to be extremely substantial in order to have
an appreciable impact on the predicted outcome. Again, this is unlikely given the previous
point. See Bueno de Mesquita, PoliticalForecasting.
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III. Forecasting the Future of the FTAA.
A.

DESCRIBING THE EXPERT-GENERATED DATA.

Fast-track authority for President Clinton or his successor is the first issue. Table 1
shows the possible outcomes,
Table 1
A Scale of Outcomes for the Issue of Fast-track Authority
0

President Clinton or his successor is denied Fast-track authority.

40 President Clinton or his successor receives Fast-track authority, but with extremely restrictive conditions pertaining to labor and environmental side deals.
60

President Clinton or his successor receives Fast-track authority, albeit with
stronger restrictions pertaining to labor and environmental side deals than he
originally requested in the fall of 1997.

100 President Clinton or his successor receives Fast-track authority in roughly the
same orm as originally requested in the fall of 1997.
which range from President Clinton or his successor being denied Fast-track authority
to obtaining Fast-track authority in roughly the same form as originally requested in the
fall of 1997. Two intermediate points along the scale show the president receiving Fasttrack authority, but under more or less restrictive conditions.
Table 2
Actor Profiles for the Issue of Fast-track Authority
Actor

Position

Salience

U.S. President
U.S. Congress
U.S. Democratic Party
U.S. Republican Party
Labor Unions
Business Associations
Environmental Groups
Government of Canada
Government of Mexico

100
60
40
100
40
100
40
100
0

.80
.60
.70
.60
.70
.50
.90
.60
.10

.90
.90
.90
.50
.50
.50
.30
.20
.10

OAS

100

.40

.10

Capability

Table 2 shows the positions, issue salience and capabilities of all the relevant actors
who might be involved in bargaining over the issue of Fast-track authority. A few illustrations should be sufficient to show that, once again, the expert-generated data possesses at

NAFTA. Law and Business Review of the Americas

418

least face validity. Several actors, including the U.S. President, Republican Party, business
associations, Government of Canada, and Organization of American States, want the
1997 request for Fast-track authority to be honored. These actors vary in capabilities and
salience. At the other extreme is the Government of Mexico, which prefers the president
and his successor are denied Fast-track authority. Note that the data for capabilities and
salience also once again seems within a credible range of values, with, for example, the
U.S. President as much more powerful than the Government of Mexico (0.90 versus 0.10)
and salience for environmental groups being more than twice that of the OAS, a multifaceted regional organization (0.90 versus 0.40).
Table 3
A Scale of Outcomes for the Form of the FTAA
0

FTAA is an extension of MERCOSUR (i.e., FTAA dominated by Southern Cone,
with the U.S. playing a very small role).

25

FTAA is a decentralised series of linked trade agreements/regimes with a number
of regional powers dominating their respective regimes (i.e., U.S. plays a small
role outside of NAFTA).

50

FTAA is a bipolar trading bloc with Brazil and the U.S. as regional hegemons.

75 FTAA is constructed de novo with the U.S. playing a large role.
100 FTAA is an extension of NAFTA with the U.S. playing a dominating role.
Table 3 reveals a number of forms that the FTAA could take. The outcomesrange from
the FTAA as an extension of MERCOSUR, i.e., the FTAA dominated by the Southern Cone
with the United States playing a very small role (0) to the FTAA as an extension of NAFTA
with the United States playing a dominating role (100). These polar points, along with the
rest of the scale, have been derived in consultation with the area expert. The same is true of
the later table corresponding to the issue of Fast-track authority.

Summer 2000

419

Table 4 lists the positions (from 0 to 100), issue salience (from 0 to 1) and capabilities
(from 0 to 1) of all relevant actors in
Table 4
Actor Profiles for the Issue of the Form of the FTAA
Actor

Position

Government of the U.S.
Government of Brazil
Government of Canada
Government of Mexico
Government of Argentina
Government of Chile
OAS
CARICOM
U.S. Democrats
U.S. Republicans

100
50
75
25
75
75
75
75
75
100

Salience
.60
.70
.80
.20
.60
.70
.40
.40
.50
.30

Capability
.90
.80
.40
.80
.80
.80
.10
.50
.60
.60

FTAA-related bargaining. The table shows several powerful actors with strong interest
in the issue. Two examples are sufficient to establish the variation in preferences among
actors. The most powerful actor, the U.S. Government, takes the extreme position identified with a dominant role for the United States. Brazil, by contrast, with a power rating
near that of the U.S. president, prefers an outcome at the center of the continuum, that is,
a bipolar trading bloc with Brazil and the United States as regional hegemons. Each of
these positions, as with the others in the table, along with scores for position and salience,
possess 'face' validity.

B.

RESULTS FROM THE MODEL.

39

With respect to the issue of Fast-track authority, the forecast converges with some difficulty on 76.4, which in Table 1 is a point that corresponds to somewhat more autonomy
than Fast-track authority with stronger restrictions pertaining to labor and environmental side deals than originally requested in 1997. In other words, we predict a more cooperative stance on the part of congressional Democrats. In large part, we posit, this reflects
the fact that Democratic leaders, such as Gephardt, will not be seeking to position themselves for a presidential run. From an initial forecast of 60, the iterations feature considerable, even volatile, movement up and down the continuum. This unstable process is
reflected in the fact that, at the final iteration, only one actor, the U.S. Democratic Party,
occupies the same position as the forecast (i.e., 76.4). The others range from the U.S.
President, still at 100, to the Government of Mexico at 30.7. Thus, the prediction of 76.4
should be regarded as the central tendency within the data, but also an outcome that very
much would be open to revision in further bargaining.

39. We are grateful to Yi Feng for using the Decision Insights software to produce the results
reported in this section.
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For the issue of the form that the FTAA will take, the forecast converges quickly on an
outcome of 75, which in Table 3 corresponds to the FTAA being constructed de novo with
the United States playing a large role. Very little movement occurs across the model's ten
iterations, with the initial forecast also being the final result after some minor movement
near the middle of the series. In addition, the forecast would appear to have a relatively
high degree of stability. Among the participants, only four-Brazil (50), Mexico (71), the
Government of the U.S. (50) and the U.S. Republicans (88)-occupy positions away from
the predicted outcome. Within this group, only the U.S. Government provokes curiosity,
because its preferred position at the end of the process of simulated bargaining-a bipolar trading bloc with Brazil-is so different than its initial position in favor of a dominant
role in the FTAA as an extension of NAFTA. This rather counterintuitive point is
explained, we suggest, by the ambivalence of the United States towards the FTAA process.
In other words, if the United States were as committed to the FTAA process as might have
been hoped, it would have dedicated more of its resources to the realization of its ideal
point. Thus the United States and Brazil end up converging on a bipolar hegemony. The
U.S. Republicans still prefer an outcome closer to U.S. dominance but have moved somewhat on the issue, and Mexico is just a little removed from the forecasted outcome of 75.
All other actors end up in agreement with the point just noted, which suggests that, if
reached, this outcome should have staying power.

IV. Conclusions.
Given the putative mandate of scientific inquiry, to explain as well as predict, this
paper represents a potentially important contribution to the literature on the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas. Moving away from the where-we-have-been towards the
where-we-are-headed can generate important insights. The danger is that these insights
are incorrect. Ultimately, of course, this paper's value will hinge on empirical validation.
However, methodologically speaking, it contributes to a growing literature-and possibly
will add to the growing confidence surrounding it-that relies on expected utility forecasting.
Substantively, this paper suggests that the United States will eventually come around to
play a role in the FTAA talks, although not as large a role as might have been expected.
Early ambivalence, then, translates into mitigated influence later in the process. As a pos*sible result, we predict an outcome that does not reflect the optimal choice of the United
States-the FTAA ultimately will constitute an agreement constructed de novo.

